We study an online market-making problem in which a learner sequentially posts bid and ask prices for a single asset while interacting with traders holding private valuations. Unlike existing online learning formulations that assume fully censored feedback, we introduce an action-dependent feedback model inspired by real limit order books: when a trade occurs, the trader's valuation remains hidden, whereas when no trade occurs, informative feedback about supply and demand is revealed. We show that this additional information fundamentally changes the learnability of the problem. In the stochastic setting with i.i.d. market prices, we propose an elimination-based algorithm that achieves $O(\sqrt T)$ regret with high probability, without requiring any smoothness assumptions on the distribution of trader valuations. We then extend this result to a broad class of mean-reverting price processes by considering both local, autoregressive dynamics and a weaker global drift condition based on cumulative deviations from the mean. Under either assumption, we establish high-probability $O(\sqrt T)$ regret bounds, relying on a new concentration inequality of independent interest. Finally, in the adversarial setting with oblivious prices, we design an explore-then-perturb algorithm that guarantees $O(T^{2/3})$ regret in expectation. Our results quantify the value of observing the order book in online market making and demonstrate that even limited, action-dependent feedback can substantially improve regret guarantees compared to standard bandit feedback models.

In this section, we provide more information on the application backgrounds, including the detailed structures of the RAS and VAS, the structures of the simulated advertising system. We also discuss the importance and universality of the IBOO problem in auto-bidding, which acts as the motivation of this work.

We present a neural network (NN) approach to fit and predict implied volatility surfaces (IVSs). Atypically to standard NN applications, financial industry practitioners use such models equally to replicate market prices and to value other financial instruments. In other words, low training losses are as important as generalization capabilities. Importantly, IVS models need to generate realistic arbitrage-free option prices, meaning that no portfolio can lead to risk-free profits. We propose an approach guaranteeing the absence of arbitrage opportunities by penalizing the loss using soft constraints. Furthermore, our method can be combined with standard IVS models in quantitative finance, thus providing a NN-based correction when such models fail at replicating observed market prices.

Accurate short-term electricity price forecasting is crucial for strategically scheduling demand and generation bids in day-ahead markets. While data-driven techniques have shown considerable prowess in achieving high forecast accuracy in recent years, they rely heavily on the quality of input covariates. In this paper, we investigate whether asynchronously published prices as a result of differing gate closure times (GCTs) in some bidding zones can improve forecasting accuracy in other markets with later GCTs. Using a state-of-the-art ensemble of models, we show significant improvements of 22% and 9% in forecast accuracy in the Belgian (BE) and Swedish bidding zones (SE3) respectively, when including price data from interconnected markets with earlier GCT (Germany-Luxembourg, Austria, and Switzerland). This improvement holds for both general as well as extreme market conditions. Our analysis also yields further important insights: frequent model recalibration is necessary for maximum accuracy but comes at substantial additional computational costs, and using data from more markets does not always lead to better performance - a fact we delve deeper into with interpretability analysis of the forecast models. Overall, these findings provide valuable guidance for market participants and decision-makers aiming to optimize bidding strategies within increasingly interconnected and volatile European energy markets.

AI agents are increasingly deployed in ecosystems where they repeatedly interact not only with each other but also with humans. In this work, we study these human-AI ecosystems from a theoretical perspective, focusing on the classical framework of repeated pricing games. In our stylized model, the AI agents play equilibrium strategies, and one or more humans manually perform the pricing task instead of adopting an AI agent, thereby defecting to a no-regret strategy. Motivated by how populations of AI agents can sustain supracompetitive prices, we investigate whether high prices persist under such defections. Our main finding is that even a single human defection can destabilize collusion and drive down prices, and multiple defections push prices even closer to competitive levels. We further show how the nature of collusion changes under defection-aware AI agents. Taken together, our results characterize when algorithmic collusion is fragile--and when it persists--in mixed ecosystems of AI agents and humans.

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We analyze sources of error in prediction market forecasts in order to bound the difference between a security's price and the ground truth it estimates.

The increasing integration of renewable energy sources (RESs) is transforming traditional power grid networks, which require new approaches for managing decentralized energy production and consumption. Microgrids (MGs) provide a promising solution by enabling localized control over energy generation, storage, and distribution. This paper presents a novel reinforcement learning (RL)-based methodology for optimizing microgrid energy management. Specifically, we propose an RL agent that learns optimal energy trading and storage policies by leveraging historical data on energy production, consumption, and market prices. A digital twin (DT) is used to simulate the energy storage system dynamics, incorporating degradation factors to ensure a realistic emulation of the analysed setting. Our approach is validated through an experimental campaign using real-world data from a power grid located in the Italian territory. The results indicate that the proposed RL-based strategy outperforms rule-based methods and existing RL benchmarks, offering a robust solution for intelligent microgrid management.